[Ocfs2-devel] [RFC] The reflink(2) system call v4.

[Joel Becker]

On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 08:18:34AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Tue, 2009-05-12 at 11:12 +1000, James Morris wrote:
> > On Mon, 11 May 2009, Joel Becker wrote:
> > 
> > > > e.g. SELinux will need to perform some checks on the operation, then 
> > > > calculate a new security context for the new file.
> > > 
> > > 	Do I need to pass in preserve_security as well so SELinux knows
> > > what the ownership check determined?
> > 
> > Not for SELinux -- its security attributes are orthogonal to DAC, and it 
> > will perform its own checks on them.
> 
> Is preserve_security supposed to also control the preservation of the
> SELinux security attribute (security.selinux extended attribute)?  I'd
> expect that either we preserve all the security-relevant attributes or
> none of them.  And if that is the case, then SELinux has to know about
> preserve_security in order to know what the security context of the new
> inode will be.  

	Thank you Stephen, you read my mind.  In the ocfs2 case, we're 
expecting to just reflink the extended attribute structures verbatim in
the preserve_security case.  So we would be ignoring whatever was set on
the new_dentry by security_inode_reflink().  This gets us the best CoW
sharing of the xattr extents, but I want to make sure that's "safe" in
the preserve_security case.

> Also, if you are going to automatically degrade reflink(2) behavior
> based on the owner_or_cap test, then you ought to allow the same to be
> true if the security module vetoes the attempt to preserve attributes.
> Either DAC or MAC logic may say that security attributes cannot be
> preserved.  Your current logic will only allow graceful degradation in
> the DAC case, but the MAC case will remain a hard failure.

	I did not think of this, and its a very good point as well.  I'm
not sure how to have the return value of security_inode_reflink()
distinguish between "disallow the reflink" and "disallow
preserve_security".  But since !preserve_security requires read access
only, perhaps we move security_inode_reflink up higher and say:

	error = security_inode_reflink(old_dentry, dir);
	if (error)
		preserve_security = 0;

Here security_inode_reflink() does not need new_dentry, because it isn't
setting a security context.  If it's ok with the reflink, we'll be
copying the extended attribute.  If it's not OK, it falls through to the
inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ) check, which will check for plain old
read access.
	What do we think?

Joel

-- 

"Under capitalism, man exploits man.  Under Communism, it's just 
   the opposite."
				 - John Kenneth Galbraith

Joel Becker
Principal Software Developer
Oracle
E-mail: joel.becker at oracle.com
Phone: (650) 506-8127